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FROM JACMAIN TO LEEMINC.
THE PROBLEM OF PROBATIONARY
EMPLOYEES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR*
By
I.

ALAN BRUDNER**

INTRODUCTION

The probationary employee has always posed special problems for arbitral jurisprudence. On the one hand, arbitrators have recognized that probationary status implies by its very nature a right to job security of a lower order
and strength than that enjoyed by permanent employees. The employer, it is
conceded, has a legitimate interest in selecting workers who are suitable both
in terms of technical competence and qualities of character, and in the public
sector this interest gains additional importance from its association with the
public interest in a meritocratic civil service.' Furthermore, the decision as to
the suitability of the probationer for the job is understood to be properly one
for the employer rather than the arbitrator, so that a great deal more deference
is paid to the employer's judgment in releasing a probationer than in dismissing someone who has already proved himself. On the other hand, it is also
recognized that, given the importance of the interest in gainful employment,
the often prolonged period of probation, and the investment he has made in
the job, the probationer has a right to protection against arbitrary and unfair
treatment. The conflict between these equally legitimate interests underlies the
two main issues in the jurisprudence concerning probationary employees:
whether and under what circumstances an arbitration board may review a deci-

@ Copyright, 1983, Alan Brudner.
* I would like to thank K.E. Swinton and Ethan Poskanzer for their comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
** Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University.
1Re Square D Co. (1955), 6 L.A.C. 289 (Taylor); Re PorcupineArea Ambulance
Services (1974), 7 L.A.C. (2d) 182 (Beatty).
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sion to terminate a probationary employee; and, assuming jurisdiction in the
Board, what is the appropriate standard of arbitral review?
In private sector arbitration, these issues, while giving rise to much difference of opinion, are nonetheless capable of determination in a relatively
straightforward manner. This is so because arbitrators in the private sector
derive their jurisdiction solely from collective agreements, which either grant
(tacitly or expressly) or deny probationers the right to grieve discharges. 2
Accordingly, it has been generally held that, except where the collective agreement expressly says otherwise, probationary employees have the same right of
access to grievance procedures as permanent ones. 3 In reviewing the termination of a probationer, however, private sector arbitrators normally apply a less
searching standard of scrutiny than they do to discharges of seniority-rated
workers, although the precise nature of the appropriate standard is still a matter of debate. The fact that arbitrators in the private sector derive their
jurisdiction exclusively from collective agreements has meant that, however
controversial and difficult the issues, their resolution can proceed straightforwardly on the basis of principle, unencumbered for the most part by legal
casuistry.
It is otherwise in the public sector. There matters are enormously complicated by the interaction between two often conflicting sources of arbitral
jurisdiction as well as by the interplay between two apparently conflicting
statutes. Arbitrators in the federal and Ontario public sectors derive their
jurisdiction to hear grievances not only from collective agreements but also
from statute. In Ontario the relevant statute is the Crown Employees Collective BargainingAct 4, section 18(2) of which grants an employee the right to
final determination of certain types of grievances by a Grievance Settlement
Board. Specifically, an employee claiming "that he has been appraised contrary to the governing principles and standards" or that he has been
"disciplined or dismissed or suspended from his employment without just
cause" may process his grievance in accordance with the procedures set out in
the collective agreement and, failing final settlement, refer the matter to the
Grievance Settlement Board. It has been consistently held that the term
"employee" in section 18(2) includes probationary as well as permanent staff. 5
These provisions must, however, be read together with section 22(5) of the
Public Service Act 6, which provides that "a deputy minister may release
from employment any public servant during the first year of his employment
2InOntario the matter has become more complicated of late, as arbitrators must
now determine whether a denial by the collective agreement of a right to grieve
dismissals is a lawful denial of a substantive right or an unlawful denial of a procedural
right. See Re Toronto Hydro-ElectricSystem and C. U.P.E., Local ) (1980), 111 D.L.R.
(3d) 693, 29 O.R. (2d) 18, 80 C.L.L.C. para. 14,035 (Ont. H.C.).
3Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, (Agincourt: Canada Law
Book, Ltd., 1977) at 385.
4R.S.O. 1980, c. 108.
5
Re Min. of Correctional Services, unreported, GSB file 12/75; Re Min. of
Attorney-General,unreported, GSB file 21/76; Jacmain v. A.-G. Can., [1978] 2S.C.R.
15, (1977)
78 C.L.L.C. para. 14,117, 81 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
6
R.S.O. 1980, c. 418.
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for failure to meet the requirements of his position". In the public sector,
therefore, whether or not a Board has jurisdiction to review the termination of
a probationary employee depends on the answer to two prior questions: where
the collective agreement expressly denies probationers access to the grievance
machinery, can the Grievance Settlement Board nevertheless claim jurisdiction
under the Crown Employees Collective BargainingAct? And, assuming such
jurisdiction, to what extent is it qualified by section 22(5) of the PublicService
Act?
The first of these questions has been answered, at least for the New
Brunswick context, by the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Re the
Queen in Right of New Brunswick andLeeming. 7 In that case the Court ruled
that the New Brunswick counterpart of the Crown Employees Collective
BargainingAct added no substantive rights to those conferred by a collective
agreement, so that the denial by the contract of a probationer's right not to be
discharged except for just cause was conclusive. The correctness of this decision and its application to the Ontario and federal contexts will be examined in
Part V.
The second question (to what extent is the Grievance Settlement Board's
jurisdiction under section 18(2) of the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining
Act modified by section 22(5) of the Public Service Act) has been answered by
the positing of a distinction between a probationer's "release" for failure to
meet the requirements of his job and his "dismissal" for disciplinary reasons.
Following the Supreme Court decision in Jacmain v. Attorney General of
Canada,8 the Grievance Settlement Board held that a bona fide release for
cause was immune from arbitral review, whereas a disciplinary dismissal was
subject to full appellate review for just cause, that is, for the sufficiency of the
grounds for discharge. 9 Furthermore, since the Grievance Settlement Board
claimed (on the authority of Jacmain) preliminary jurisdiction to determine
whether a release was a camouflaged dismissal, and since absence of cause is
taken to be an indication of "dismissal", it could in effect review a release according to a lower standard of good faith to ensure that it was properly
motivated by concerns of occupational competence rather than by ill-will or
prejudice. The result of this approach is that the Board applies a higher or
lower standard of review depending on whether the conduct that gave rise to
termination was culpable or blameless even though the reason for termination
in either case is unsuitability for the job. Thus the probationer whom the
employer deems unsuitable because of wilful misconduct stands a better
chance of being reinstated than one deemed unsuitable for reasons of personality or compatibility.
It is submitted that this result is both illogical and contrary to sound principle. It seems to have been arrived at because the terms "release" and
"dismissal" have been taken to designate mutually distinct and self-subsistent
concepts referring to the nature of the conduct, innocent or blameworthy, that
7[1981] 1 S.C.R. 129, 118 D.L.R. (3d) 202,81 C.L.L.C. para. 14,087.

8Supra note 5.
9
Re Leslie and the Crown in Right of Ont. (1978), 22 L.A.C. (2d) 126 (Adams); Re
Haladayand the Crown in Right ofOnt. (1979), 22 L.A.C. (2d) 145 (Swan).
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caused the termination. It shall be the argument of this essay that this approach is incorrect, because it leads to a standard of review of terminations for
misconduct that stretches the proper limits of arbitral authority. The standard
of review most consistent with the role of the arbitrator, it will be argued, is
one which scrutinizes the criteria of evaluation as well as the opportunity afforded the probationer to meet these criteria, but which leaves to the
employer's judgment the decision as to whether the criteria have in fact been
satisfied. Further, this standard ought to be applied whether the probationer's
unsuitability for the job manifests itself in innocent incompetence or in
blameworthy conduct. The distinction between "release" and "dismissal"
should, accordingly, not be taken to refer to employer responses to different
types of conduct, but should be used merely as a device to gain review of
releases to ensure that they are properly motivated. Only if the release fails to
meet the standard of good faith should it be characterized as a dismissal so as
to permit the Board to reinstate the probationer under section 18(2)(c). In
other words, the definition of "dismissal" should not be termination for
misconduct but rather bad faith "release".
II.

THE STANDARD OF ARBITRAL REVIEW

At least three different standards of review have been applied to the termination of probationary employees. The earlier cases seem to have decided
that the employer has an absolute discretion to release a probationer, and that,
therefore, a board of arbitration has no jurisdiction to inquire into the reasons
for such a release. 10 At the other extreme is the view propounded in Re Porcupine Area Ambulance Service and C. U.P.E., Local 1484,11 and followed in
a number of cases during the last decade. According to this view, the
employer's decision to terminate a probationer is reviewable not only for the
rationality (that is, relevance to suitability) of the criteria applied in the evaluation of the employee but also for the reasonableness of the evaluation itself.
To be sure, it is only a "palpably unreasonable" assessment with which the arbitration board will interfere. Nevertheless, the employer must, according to
Re Porcupine, "not only prove the facts upon which he based his action, but
in addition that the employee's conduct demonstrates that it is reasonable to
conclude such an employee will likely prove unsuitable as a seniority-rated
employee".12

Between these extremes is the position well summarized by Palmer.
"Although", writes Palmer, "there is some reluctance to examine the validity
of the employer's determination of the suitability of a probationary employee.., all arbitrators appear to accept that such a determination must be
reached in a fair way." ' 3 The requirement of fairness may be subdivided into
10 Square D Co., supranote 1; Re FittingsLtd. (1956), 6 L.A.C. 300 (Curtis), Re
Dryden PaperCo. (1964), 14 L.A.C. 405 (Lane).
"Supra note 1. See also Re B.C. Telephone Co. (1977), 15 L.A.C. (2d) 310
(Weiler); Re InlandKenworthSalesLtd. and C.A.LM.A. W. (1980), 22 L.A.C. (2d) 163
(Gall); Re Regional District of Nanaimo and C. U.P.E., Local 401 (1980), 25 L.A.C.
(2d) 34 (Vickers).
12 Supra note 1, at 186.
13
Palmer, Collective Agreement Arbitration in Canada, (Toronto: Butterworths,

1978) at 243.

1983]

ProbationaryEmployees

three elements. First, the facts upon which the assessment is based must be
proved by the employer. 14 It would be obviously unjust to the probationer to
permit his employer to release him on the basis of occurrences which the
employer has either fabricated or mistakenly apprehended. Second, the
employee must be evaluated in terms of objective criteria that are'rationally
related to suitability for the job.15 Thus, terminations for reasons of race,
religion, union activity, malice, or failure to meet standards disproportionate
to the true requirements of the position will be struck down. Third, though this
element is less well established, the employee must be given a fair opportunity
to meet the employer's standards; that is, he must have notice of the
employer's expectations unless these are obvious from the circumstances,
reasonable instruction
in his responsibilities, and sufficient time to reveal his
6
capacities. '
In public sector arbitration, the employer will often urge the first standard
upon the Board, relying either on a clause in the collective agreement denying
probationers the right to grieve a termination or on section 22(5) of the Public
Service Act, or on both. In the period immediately preceding the Supreme
Court decision in Jacmain, the Grievance Settlement Board rejected these
arguments in favour of a standard of review that, it is submitted, failed properly to respect the difference between probationary and permanent employees.
In Re Eriksen and Ministry of CorrectionalServices, 17 for example, the Board
seized jurisdiction to review the termination of a probationer on the basis of
section 18(2) (then section 17(2) ) of the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act despite a clause in the collective agreement denying probationers the
right to grieve. It went on to hold that the distinction between a release for
failure to meet the requirements of the job and a dismissal for cause did not
necessarily correspond to a difference between the terminations of two types
of employee, probationary and permanent; rather, it corresponded to a difference between two types of conduct, one blameless the other culpable, both
of which might be grounds for the termination of a probationer. If the latter
were guilty of misconduct, the Board had jurisdiction under section 18(2)(c) to
review disciplinary discharges; if he were released for unfitness, the Board had
jurisdiction under section 18(2)(b) to determine whether he had been "appraised contrary to the governing standards and principles". In either case the
Board would apply the standard of review established in Re Porcupine.In the
result, the Grievance Settlement Board decided that conduct meriting a fiveweek suspension without pay (imposed by the Board) did not warrant release
of the probationer for failure to meet the requirements of the job. 18
4

Re Tecumseh Products of CanadaLtd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 355 (Weatherill); Re
Board of Education for the Borough of Scarborough (1980), 26 L.A.C. (2d) 160
(Picher); Re PCL PackagingLtd. (1981), 29 L.A.C. (2d) 372 (Saltman).
11
Re Polymer Corp. (1964), 15 L.A.C. 345 (Anderson); Re Tecumseh Products of
Canada Ltd., supra note 14; Re PorcupineArea Ambulance Services, supra note 1; Re
Bd. of Ed.for the Borough of Scarborough,supra note 14; Re Pacific Western Airlines
Ltd., (1981), 30 L.A.C. (2d) 68 (Sychuk); Re FalconbridgeNickel Mines Ltd. (1981), 1
L.A.C. (3d) 158 (Picher).
16Re Toronto Hydro-Electric System (1981), 30 L.A.C. (2d) 58 (Barton); Re
Pacific Western Airlines Ltd., supranote 15.
17Supranote 5.
18Re Joyce and Min.ofAttorney-General,supranote 5.
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This approach was certainly misguided. A standard of review that
scrutinizes not only the criteria of evaluation but also the reasonableness of the
employer's assessment involves an exercise of authority that strains both the
legitimacy and the competence of the arbitrator. In the case of a disciplinary
discharge of a permanent employee, the Board may properly review for adequacy of grounds because it is reviewing the fairness or justice of a penalty.
The worker has already demonstrated his capacity for the job, so that the purpose of the discharge is not primarily to rid the employer of an incompetent
employee but to deter others from similar conduct. However, in the case of a
probationer, any misconduct is simply part of the totality of the employee's
work performance that must be considered in assessing his suitability for the
job. To review for adequacy of grounds here, therefore, is to review not the
fairness of a penalty but rather the soundness of a managerial prediction as to
the probable success of an employee at his work. No doubt it is possible to imagine cases where the termination of a probationer is for misconduct so trivial
and isolated that it cannot have been imposed for any other than punitive
reasons. In such cases a review for unreasonableness is unavoidable, because
the judgment that the termination is penal presupposesthe conclusion that it is
unjustified. But such a review is here also permissible because it is ex hypothesi
the review of a penalty and not of a managerial assessment. In all but these extreme cases, however, the misconduct of the probationer will be relevant to the
question of his suitability, so that any review for the sufficiency of the grounds
for termination will be one not for the fairness of the discharge but for its
wisdom. The arbitrator, it is submitted, has neither the competence nor the
authority to make such a judgment; it is no part of his function to render
employer-like decisions or to impose upon employers workers whom they have
in good faith deemed unsuitable for the job. 19
The Re Porcupinestandard fails, therefore, not because it leans too far in
favour of the employee (which is a matter of opinion) but because it is inconsistent with the specific function of the rights arbitrator, which is to ensure
fairness rather than empirical reasonableness. By this criterion the first standard (no review) also fails, for the obvious reason that it leaves fairness without
a sword. The intermediate standard, on the other hand, is the one best suited
to the arbitrator's function, for it focuses exclusively on the fairness (that is
relevance) of the criteria of assessment as well as of the opportunity afforded
the individual to meet them, while leaving to the employer the task of empirical judgment. It therefore also achieves an equitable balance between the
employee's interest in objective treatment and the employer's interest in selecting qualified staff.
III. "RELEASE" AND "DISMISSAL"
The Grievance Settlement Board was compelled to revise its approach to
public sector probationers by the Supreme Court decision in Jacmain.20 The
facts of the case illustrate the pitfalls of a too literal interpretation of the
9 This

is not to suggest that a court may not require a public employer to meet
standards of procedural fairness in releasing an employee for unfitness; see Re*
Nicholson andHaldimand-Norfolk RegionalBd. of Commissionersof Police, [1979] 1
S.C.R. 311; Re Haladayand the Crown in Right of Ont., supra note 9, at 149.
20 Supra note 5.
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distinction between "releases" and "dismissals". Jacmain was a probationary
employee in the Office of Official Languages. During his period of probation
he was given a five-day suspension for irascible behaviour, but the penalty was
revoked when Jacmain's grievance succeeded. A few months later Jacmain's
supervisor gave him notice of rejection for cause pursuant to section 28(3) of
the Public Service Employment Act, 2 1 which is the federal counterpart of section 22(5) of the Public Service Act. When his grievance failed, Jacmain referred the matter to adjudication under section 91(1)(b) of the Public Service
Staff Relations Act,22 which permits an employee access to adjudication if the
treatment complained of is "disciplinary action resulting in discharge, suspension, or a financial penalty". As it had done at all previous levels of the
grievance process, the employer disputed the jurisdiction of the adjudicator on
the ground that Jacmain's termination was a "rejection for cause" rather than
a disciplinary discharge. The adjudicator held that, while he had no jurisdiction to review a rejection for cause, he did have authority to review the
employer's characterization of the termination to ensure that what purported
to be a rejection for cause was not in fact a disguised attempt at disciplinary
discharge. Finding that the only conduct supporting the termination was that
for which Jacmain had earlier been suspended, the adjudicator labelled the termination a discharge, seized jurisdiction under section 91(1)(b), and ruled that
the conduct of the grievor did not warrant termination.
On appeal by the employer to the Federal Court of Appeal, the adjudicator's decision was reversed. The Court agreed that the adjudicator had
authority to review the characterization of the termination for colourability.
But, said the Court, once he had found that the termination was for bonafide
reasons, he had no further jurisdiction to weigh the sufficiency of those
reasons. "There could only be disciplinary action camouflaged as rejection,"
said Heald J., "in a case where no valid or bona fide grounds existedfor rejection." 23 In other words, the distinction between rejection for cause and
disciplinary discharge does not correspond to a difference between two types
of conduct, one blameworthy the other innocent, because blameworthy conduct can be a cause for rejection. Rather the distinction is purely reflexive in
that sense that, insofar as it applies to probationary employees, disciplinary
action means frivolous or bad faith rejection. There are, no doubt, passages in
Heald J.'s judgment in which His Lordship holds to the more traditional
distinction based on types of behaviour. However, in these passages Heald J.
is trying to conform his reasoning to an earlier judgment of the Court in Re
Fardella and the Queen,24 where Jackett, C.J. had insisted on the illusory
distinction between insubordination that is cause for rejection and insubordination that is grounds for disciplinary discharge. The clear meaning of the
words quoted above is that Heald J., speaking for the Court, has rejected this
distinction.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Court of Appeal was
upheld. It is a measure of the complexity of the issues involved that, despite a
21R.S.C. 1970,
22 R.S.C.
23

c. P-32.

1970, c. P-35.
A.-G. Can. v. Public Service Staff Relations Bd., [1977] 1 F.C. 91 at 99. (Emphasis added.)
24 [1974] 2 F.C.R. 465, (1974), 47 D.L.R. (3d) 689, 5 N.R. 571.
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six-three majority decision, the members of the Court aligned themselves differently on most of the major points. All nine judges agreed that an adjudicator could review the employer's characterization of the termination for
colourability, but that once he found a good faith rejection, no further inquiry
was permitted. Five judges (Pigeon, Beetz, Dickson, Laskin and Spence JJ.)
held that the adjudicator could review on the merits in the case of a
disciplinary discharge, while the other four (de Grandpr6, Martland, Judson
and Ritchie JJ.) left this question open. Moreover, these four judges referred
approvingly to Heald J.'s interpretation of the distinction between rejection
for cause and disciplinary discharge, and since the lower court's decision turned on that distinction, they upheld it. Two judges (Pigeon and Beetz JJ.)
disagreed with Heald J.'s approach, arguing that the adjudicator was not entitled to find a disciplinary action solely on the basis of an inability to find a
sufficient cause for rejection. Since, however, they thought that this is what
the adjudicator had done, they sided with de Grandpr6, Martland, Judson and
Ritchie JJ. in upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal. Three judges
(Dickson, Laskin and Spence JJ.) dissented. Speaking for the minority,
Dickson J. argued that "rejection for cause and disciplinary discharge are
separate and distinct concepts",25 referring to different types of reasons for
terminating a probationer, and that the adjudicator had not erred in finding
that Jacmain had been terminated for disciplinary reasons. Thus a five-four
majority (Dickson, Laskin, Spence, Pigeon and Beetz JJ.) disagreed with the
Court of Appeal's interpretation of the difference between rejection for cause
and disciplinary discharge. That interpretation is no doubt odd from a lexical
standpoint; nevertheless it is, I submit, the correct one.
Let us consider Dickson J.'s objection to the approach taken by the Court
of Appeal. The crucial passage reads as follows:
As I read the judgment of Mr. Justice Heald, his reasoning appears to proceed on
this basis:
1. The appellant's attitude was wrong.
2. This would justify rejection for cause.
3. There could only be discharge for disciplinary reasons when there was no
valid cause for rejection.
4. Therefore, the termination of employment was a rejection for cause, and the
adjudicator was without jurisdiction.
The reasoning, with respect, contains fundamental fallacies. First, it approaches
the matter from the wrong end. Two questions must be distinguished: (i) was the
termination of employment disciplinary discharge or rejection for cause? (ii) was
termination justified? The first is a jurisdictional question; the second goes to the
merits. Mr. Justice Heald answered the second question and used the answer to
resolve the first question. The proper approach is to answer the first question and
then, depending upon the answer, to proceed to the second question. Second, it
does not inexorably follow that, simply because there lurked in the background
some cause which might justify rejection, the termination must, of necessity, be rejection and not disciplinary discharge.

On the surface, Mr. Justice Dickson's reasoning seems impeccable. Let
us, however, consider the matter more closely. The first question the learned
25
Jacmain,supra note 5, at 20.
26
1d.

at 32-33.
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Judge would ask (was the termination a discharge or a rejection?) assumes that
there is an essential, analytic distinction between these cohcepts as applied to
probationary employees. What could be the ground of this distinction? It must
lie either in the nature of the conduct provoking the employer response or in
the motives of the employer. Yet it seems clear that any conduct which would
justify a disciplinary discharge could also justify (in the case of a probationer)
a rejection for cause. So there is nothing in the nature of the employee's conduct that could tell us whether the employer's action was a "rejection" or a
"discharge". Must we then inquire into the employer's motives? But (evidentiary problems aside) in any termination of a probationer for misconduct, the
employer's motives are bound to be mixed. The termination serves both as an
example to others and as a rejection of an employee deemed unqualified for
the job. If an employer honestly intends the latter objective, it is difficult to see
why the mere fact that he also intends the former should expose his assessment
of a probationer to the same standard of review that is applied to the terminations of permanent employees. But what, it may be inquired, of an employee
whose work and overall attitude are beyond reproach and who is terminated
for some trivial misdemeanor? Is it not clear at least in these extreme cases that
the termination was purely disciplinary? Indeed it is. However, it will be
observed that we arrive at this conclusion by the very method of reasoning urged by Heald J. and forbidden us by Dickson and Pigeon JJ. That is to say, we
conclude that the action is disciplinary from the fact that there is no valid
cause for rejection.
At bottom, Dickson J. wants to insist on an independent notion of
disciplinary discharge because he fears that, without such a concept, any instance of disciplinary discharge would be construable as a rejection for cause,
and the protection afforded probationers by section 91(1) of the PublicService
Staff Relations Act would prove illusory. 27 However, this is not the case. As
long as the adjudicator has jurisdiction to go behind the employer's
characterization of the termination, he has leverage with which to review a
release to ensure that it was a good faith rejection for unfitness. If (and only if)
he finds that it was not, he may characterize the termination as a disciplinary
discharge, take jurisdiction under section 91(1)(b), and review for just cause.
IV. THE REVISION OF ERIKSEN
It will be recalled that, prior to Jacmain, the Grievance Settlement Board
a
claimed jurisdiction to review for just cause whether the termination was 28
"release" or a "dismissal". In Re Leslie and the Crown in Right of Ontario,
the Grievance Settlement Board had to reconsider its approach to probationary employees in light of the unanimous opinion of the Court in Jacmain
that an arbitrator had no jurisdiction to review a good faith rejection for
cause. The Board held that section 18(2)(c) gave it jurisdiction to review
disciplinary dismissals, but that it had no authority to review releases for unsuitability unless the parties conferred such jurisdiction upon it in the collective agreement. In the words of the Chairman, "the bonafide release of a pro21Id. at 20.
28
Supra note 9.
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bationary employee in the first year of his employment made in good faith and
for failure to meet the requirements of his position cannot be contested before
this Board under section 17(2)(c)". 29 However, the next question is: how can
the Board obtain jurisdiction to review a release for bad faith? The Chairman
answered this question as follows:
Until the Supreme Court of Canada has said otherwise, this Board is of the opin-

ion that the employer cannot camouflage either discipline or the termination of an
employee for a reason other than the employee's failure to meet the requirements
of his position ... by the guise of a 'release' under s.22(5) of the Public Service
Act. This Board, therefore, has3ojurisdiction to review a contested release to ensure
that it is what it purports to be.

In other words, the Board has authority to review a release for colourability; and if it finds that such a release was made in bad faith, that is, for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to meet the requirements of his
position, it may seize jurisdiction to review it under section 18(2)(c). The
Board thus seems to have adopted Heald J.'s approach in holding that a bad
faith release will give rise to an inference of a disciplinary discharge. On the
other hand, it is clear that the Board has not restricted the notion of
disciplinary discharge to mean a bad faith release. That is to say, it continues
to view "dismissal" as an independent and self-subsistent concept defined by
reference to the type of conduct that provoked the termination. This is made
explicit in Re Haladay and the Crown in Right of Ontario,31 where the Board

declared that "the hallmark of dismissal is punishment for voluntary
malfeasance". 32 Accordingly, the distinction between "release" and
"dismissal" is principally a distinction between morally blameless and morally
blameworthy conduct.
What are the consequences of this approach? First, if the conduct allegedly provoking the termination is innocent, an arbitrator can review for bad faith
or improper motives only; there is no jurisdiction to review the reasonableness
of the decision. If, on the other hand, the conduct is blameworthy, the termination is subject to review for just cause or for the sufficiency of the
grounds for discharge. The arbitrator thus applies two different standards of
review depending on the nature of the conduct that led to termination. But
since conduct that warrants a disciplinary dismissal is also conduct that could
warrant a rejection for unfitness, there is no rational basis for this double
standard of review. In either case the reason for termination is the same: unfitness for the job. The only situation (as we have seen) in which the double
standard is justified is where the termination could not possibly have been for
unfitness and is therefore properly construable as punishment pure and simple. But this is to define "dismissal" not by reference to conduct but by
reference to the validity of the reasons for "release".
Second, the Board's definition of "dismissal" leads not only to an irrational double standard of review but also to a standard of review in cases of
29

1d.at
d.
31

134.

30

Supra note 9.
1d. at 156. Cf. Re Robertson and Treasury Bd., unreported, PSSRB file
166-2-454; and Re Bd. of Ed.for the Borough of Scarborough,supra note 14, at 171.
32
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misconduct that usurps the legitimate role of the employer. The Board has
now deemed it proper to defer to managerial discretion in cases of good faith
rejection for cause. Since misconduct is, except in extreme circumstances,
reasonably construable as cause, it should no more interfere with the
employer's decision where the conduct of the employee is blameworthy than
when it is innocent.
Third, the concept of dismissal adopted by the Board leads to procedural difficulties which it acknowledged in Re Haladay.33 Given the jurisdictional consequences of a finding of "dismissal", the employer must adduce
evidence of unfitness without introducing anything that might give rise to an
inference of blameworthiness. For its part the union must show that the
employee was terminated for misconduct without allowing the inference that
the allegations of blameworthiness are well-founded. The result, as the Board
noted, is that arbitrators are left to decide the all-important jurisdictional issue
largely within an "evidentiary vacuum".
Instead of looking at the nature of the probationer's conduct, the Board
should look first at whether there were bonafide reasons for termination. Only
in the absence of such reasons should the Board characterize a termination as a
dismissal and take jurisdiction under section 18(2)(c). It may be argued,
however, that this is a highly artificial and unduly complicated means of protecting probationers against arbitrary treatment, and there is considerable
merit in this reproach. Far more elegant would be a line of attack that relied on
section 18(2)(b), which gives the Grievance Settlement Board jurisdiction to
review an employee's grievance based on a claim "that he has been appraised
contrary to the governing, principles and standards". 34 Since this provision
speaks only of standards, it is peculiarly well adapted to the situation of probationers, for whom the appropriate standard of review is one which scrutinizes
the criteria of assessment rather than the assessment itself. Accordingly, any
termination of a probationary employee, whether or not for misconduct,
could be reviewed by the Board under section 18(2)(b) to ensure that proper
criteria had been applied. "Governing" could then be interpreted to mean
standards that are ascertainable, relevant, and uniformly applied. Into the requirement of ascertainability, moreover, could be read the elements of fair opportunity mentioned above. Here there would be no need to distinguish between "release" and "dismissal", no need to base jurisdiction on a prior finding of fact, and no need to have one standard of review for innocent conduct
and another for blameworthy conduct. Unfortunately, however, the
Grievance Settlement Board has lately placed an exceedingly narrow construction on section 18(2)(b). In Tucker v. The Crown in Right of Ontario,35 the
Board held that "governing principles and standards" meant "formal procedures", and this view has been followed in subsequent cases. 36 The implication is that if there are no formal procedures of evaluation, the employee cannot claim that he was appraised contrary to them. It seems obvious, however,
33
Supra note
34

9, at 156.
R.S.O. 1980, c. 108.
35 Unreported, GSB file 206178.
36 See Winnie Leung and Min. of Industry and Tourism, unreported, GSB file
80/78; Pecoskie and the Crown in Right of Ont., unreported, GSB file 95/80; Atkin
and the Crown in Right of Ont., unreported, GSB file 322/80.
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that the absence of formal procedures makes it all the more imperative that the
Board supply standards of fair appraisal by which to control the
capriciousness of employers.
V. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO
GRIEVE
Thus far it has been argued that the appropriate standard for reviewing
releases of probationary employees is one that scrutinizes the relevance and
publicity of, as well as the opportunity for satisfying, the criteria of assessment, and that in Ontario public sector arbitration this standard of review can
be applied in either of two ways: under section 18(2)(c), through review of
releases for colourability, where a finding of unfair assessment can give
jurisdiction to reinstate for dismissal without just cause, or (and preferably)
under section 18(2)(b) through a direct review of the criteria of assessment.
Still to be considered is the effect of a clause in a collective agreement denying
probationers the right to grieve a termination.
In the private sector, this issue has lately been the subject of considerable
arbitral controversy. The leading case is Re Toronto Hydro-Electric System
and C. U.P.E., Local 1, 3 7 in which the Ontario Divisional Court upheld a probationer's right of access to grievance machinery in the face of a collective
agreement purporting to deny him that right. The Court held that the collective agreement violated section 37 (now section 44) of the Ontario Labour
RelationsAct, 38 which enjoins the parties to submit all differences during the
life of their agreement to arbitration. The parties could, the Court said, agree
to deny probationers the substantive right not to be terminated except for just
cause; they could not, however, derogate from the procedural right conferred on
all employees by statute to vindicate whatever substantive rights the collective
agreement gave them. On appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, the decision
was upheld on the sole ground that it was not patently unreasonable, 39 and the
Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. This lukewarm ratification of a twoone decision has emboldened some arbitrators to take the view that the issue is
still unsettled. Thus, in Re Dominion Stores Ltd. and Retail, Wholesale and
Department Store Union, Local 414,40 the Board held that a collective agreement denying probationers access to grievance machinery did not violate section 37 of the OntarioLabour RelationsAct because the latter conferred no
rights on the individual. Rather, said the Board, section 37 merely enjoins the
establishment of machinery for the resolution of differences under the agreement, leaving the parties free to bargain over the nature and terms of such pro41
cedures.
In Leeming 42 the issue of the relationship between contractual and
17 Supra note
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R.S.O.
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1980, c. 228.
Re Toronto Hydro-Electric System and C.U.P.E., Local 1 (1981), 113 D.L.R.
(3d) 512n. (C.A.).
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statutory rights of grievance for probationers came before the Supreme Court.
The case concerned the interaction between a collective agreement and a provision of the New Brunswick PublicService LabourRelationsAct 43 modelled on
section 91 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act. The agreement provided
that "no employee who has completed his probationary period shall be
suspended or discharged except for just cause". It further provided that probationary employees "shall be entitled to all rights and privileges of the Agreement, except with respect to discharge", and that the employment of such probationers "may be terminated at any time during the probationary period
without recourse to the grievance procedure". Accordingly, the agreement
denied probationers the substantive right not to be discharged for disciplinary
reasons except for just cause as well as the procedural right to grieve terminations in general. Both the adjudicator and the Court of Appeal held that these
provisions were ineffective in depriving the grievor of her rights because section 92(1)(b) of the Public Service LabourRelationsAct conferred independent jurisdiction on the adjudicator to hear grievances concerning disciplinary
discharges. Finding that the grievor was terminated for disciplinary reasons,
the adjudicator took jurisdiction under the Act, applied a just cause standard
and reinstated the employee. The Court of Appeal upheld the adjudicator
(with variation of the award for compensation), arguing that the collective
agreement denied probationers only a procedural right of grievance while remaining silent on their substantive rights to a just cause standard of discharge.
The denial of the procedural right could not stand, however, in the face of the
statute's conferral of such a right, while the agreement's silence on the question of the acceptable grounds for discharge left the Court free to apply the
common law standard of just cause.
The Supreme Court reversed. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Martland
J. said:
In my opinion, sections 91 and 92 of the Act do not purport to confer substantive
rights upon employees in addition to their fights as defined in the collective agreement.... In putting the respondent into the same position as that of a permanent
employee, the adjudicator ignored the express provisions of ... the collective
agreement, [which] ... enables the employer to terminate the employment of a
probationary employee without recourse to the grievance procedure."

The decision can be interpreted in two ways. The Court may be saying
that the collective agreement exhausts the terms and conditions of the grievor's
employment and that therefore the Act adds no new statutory rights to those
agreed to by the parties. This reading is suggested by passages in which
Martland J. disapprovingly interprets the lower Court's position as stating the
opposite conclusion, as well as by his apparent acceptance in the passage
quoted above of the collective agreement's denial to probationers of both
substantive and procedural rights of grievance. It is unlikely, however, that the
Court meant to go this far. To say that the statute adds no rights to the collective agreement is to say either that the statute creates no rights at all or that it
creates rights from which the parties may opt out. The first alternative is inconsistent with Jacmain, and since Martland J. makes no reference to that
43
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44 Supranote 7,

at 206-207.
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decision (in which he concurred), we may assume he did not mean to overrule
it. Furthermore, while the suggestion that statutory grievance procedures confer no individual rights has some plausibility in the context of private sector
labour relations, 45 it cannot be seriously maintained with respect to statutes in
the public sector. Unlike their private sector counterparts, public service
labour relations statutes typically give access to adjudication, in certain circumstances, to the individual employee rather than to the parties to the collective agreement. Thus the New Brunswick statute (like the Public Service Staff
RelationsAct and the Crown Employees Collective BargainingAct) explicitly

confers on the individual a right to refer disciplinary discharges to adjudication should he be dissatisfied with the results of his grievance at lower levels;
and it allows him in these circumstances to carry the action himself. 46 Thus the
individual has a right to grieve disciplinary action quite apart from, and in
he may have under the collective agreement as a
addition to, any rights
47
member of the union.
Did the Court in Leeming mean to say that the statute confers rights from
which the parties may opt out? This too is unlikely. In the first place, if the
statutory right to grieve a disciplinary action belongs to the individual
employee, it is difficult to see how the union could be permitted to bargain it
away. Since the statute embodies a public policy of protecting individual rights
of grievance against union majorities, it would seem to come under the exception to the rule that allows the parties to contract out of statutory provisions. 48
In any case, such a contracting out appears to be explicitly ruled out by section
63(2)(a), which stipulates that "no collective agreement shall provide, directly
or indirectly, for the alteration or elimination of any existing term or condition
of employment... the alteration or elimination of which.., would require or
have the effect of requiring the enactment or amendment of any legislation by
the Legislature. . . .,,49 Secondly, Martland J. himself recognized the primacy

of the statute over the collective agreement in saying that the respondent was
"bound by the provisions of [the agreement] unless there can be found in the
Act some provision which diminished their impact on her". 50 His Lordship
was here faithfully following section 65 of the New Brunswick statute (section
58 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act) which provides that a collective

agreement is binding upon the employees in the bargaining unit, "subject to...
this Act".
A more likely interpretation of the decision in Leeming is that the statute
confers on employees only a proceduralright to grieve disciplinary action; it
confers no substantive rights. The latter arise solely from the collective agreement, so that if the parties deny a probationer the right not to be discharged
except for just cause, he has nothing upon which to excercise his undoubted
statutory right of access to adjudication. Such a reading is supported
(arguably) by the letter of sections 91 and 92; it is formally consistent with Jac45

See Re Dominion StoresLtd., supra note 40.
PublicService LabourRelationsAct, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-25, ss. 91-92.
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main, in which the ,ollective agreement did not exclude probationers from the
substantive rights of employees; and it is consistent with evolving jurisprudence in the private sector.
If this is indeed the correct reading of Leeming, then it is equally applicable to disputes arising under the Public Service Staff Relations Act, section 91 of which replicates section 92 of the New Brunswick statute. The result
is that, Jacmain notwithstanding, a probationer in the federal public service
may be denied any review of a disciplinary discharge (including a bad faith
release) by an agreement between the union and the employer excluding him
from the right not to be discharged except for just cause.
The case, it is submitted, is wrongly decided. First, there is evidence
within the four corners of the statute suggesting that section 91 confers
substantive rights on employees. Section 1 of the New Brunswick Act (section
2 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act) -extends the right to grieve
disciplinary action to managerial employees - that is, to persons otherwise
excluded from the definition of employee and hence also from collective
bargaining rights under the Act. If collective agreements can alone give content to the right to grieve, then these employees are forever doomed to come to
arbitration empty-handed, a rather odd result given that the Legislature went
out of its way to protect them. Second, the decision is wrong from the standpoint of a purposive analysis of the statute. A procedural right without a
substantive one upon which to exercise it is really no more a right than is a
substantive right without a remedy. Accordingly, by interpreting section 91 as
conferring on the individual a mere procedural right, one which the parties
may empty of significance by denying him substantive rights, the Court has in
effect permitted the parties to trade away rights reserved by statute to the individual. The best reading of the decision thus leads to the same result as does
the worst reading. By allowing the parties to render nugatory the rights
guaranteed by section 91, the Court has for all practical purposes made the
statute subject to the collective agreement. If, as seems clear, the purpose of
section 91 was to safeguard individual rights of grievance against the
vicissitudes of bargaining power and majority rule, then the decision in Leem51
ing has subverted that intention. It is thus contrary to the InterpretationAct,
which directs courts to give statutes the large and liberal construction needed
to fulfill their objectives.
Fortunately, however, the decision in Leeming is probably inapplicable to
disputes arising under the Crown Employees Collective BargainingAct. This is
because the language of the latter statute is different in a number of crucial
respects from that of the New Brunswick legislation and the Public Service
Staff Relations Act. If Leeming is taken to mean that the New Brunswick
statute added no rights to those available under the collective'agreement, then
this can have no relevance to the Crown Employees CollectiveBargainingAct,
for the latter explicitly gives the employee "in addition to" his rights under a
collective agreement a right to grieve disciplinary action or an unfair
appraisal. 52 Accordingly, there is here no doubt that the statute confers rights
5' R.S.O. 1980, c. 219.
See Perrin's dissent in Abbott and the Crown in the Right of Ont., unreported,
GSB file 481/80.
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personalized in the individual, rights which the parties cannot trade away.
Moreover, even if Leeming is taken to mean that the New Brunswick statute
conferred only procedural rights, leaving substantive ones to be determined by
the collective agreement, it is still inapplicable to the Crown Employees Collective BargainingAct. For in contrast to both the New Brunswick statute and the
Public Service Staff Relations Act, section 18(2)(c) of the Crown Employees
Collective BargainingAct clearly gives a right of grievance to an individual
claiming that "he has been disciplined or dismissed or suspended from his
employment without just cause". In other words, the section confers on all
employees in the bargaining unit a substantive right not to be disciplined
without just cause as well as a procedural right of access to adjudication.
VI. CONCLUSION
Within a span of three years, the Supreme Court has rendered two major
decisions regarding the rights of probationers in the public sector. Although
these decisions can stand together in a strictly doctrinal sense, they are
nonetheless difficult to reconcile from the standpoint of principle. In Jacmain
a majority of the Court recognized that probationers ought to have the same
rights as other employees with regard to disciplinary action, and that, even
with regard to releases for unfitness, they were entitled to a review for colourability to ensure that what purported to be a release was not a disguised attempt at discipline. The rationale for this approach is clear: while deference
must be paid (particularly in the public sector, where the merit principle requires it) to managerial discretion in matters pertaining to the selection of
staff, disciplinary action is properly subject to review for fairness irrespective
of whether the employee is probationary or permanent. Although it is true
that the Court in Jacmain failed to arrive at a definition of disciplinary
discharge that adequately distinguishes it from rejection for cause, it
nonetheless recognized that the Legislature had, in section 91 of the Public
Service Staff Relations Act, ensured individual employees protection against
arbitrary punishment. In Leeming, on the other hand, the Court ruled that the
protection against arbitrary treatment afforded probationers by statute could
be bargained away by the parties to the collective agreement. It thus not only
frustrated the statutory intention of securing rights to employees qua individuals; it also declared that what the government could not do as a government through the Public Service Employment Act, it could do as an employer
through the collective agreement.
On the other hand, the decision in Leeming is bound to have a salutary effect in the private sector, where it supports, or can be read as supporting, a
progressive trend toward reading into private sector statutes a guarantee to
probationers of at least a procedural right of access to grievance machinery.
No doubt the parties may undermine this right by denying probationers
substantive rights to a just cause dismissal. Still, it is a right they did not
previously enjoy, and it is now open to arbitrators to interpret contract
language to determine whether substantive or procedural rights have been
denied. Conceivably the Court in Leeming took its cue from the trend in
private sector adjudication culminating in Toronto Hydro. If so, it failed to
recognize that what was a progressive step in the private sector is a retrograde
one in the public.

